

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SEOUL 03365 251043Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----251044Z 106403 /10
O 250850Z APR 77
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3467

S E C R E T SEOUL 3365

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR PINT KS US
SUBJ: PRESIDENT PARK AND HUMAN RIGHTS

SUMMARY: OVER WEEKEND I MET PRIVATELY WITH FORMER PRIME MINISTER KIM CHONG-P'IL AND FORMER AMBASSADOR TO US HAM PYONG-CHUN, BOTH OF WHOM RECENTLY MET AT LENGTH WITH PRESIDENT PARK. DISCUSSION AT BOTH MEETINGS FOCUSED ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE AND PRESIDENT PARK'S VIEWS. BOTH KIM AND HAM FOUND VERY LITTLE DISPOSITION ON PART PRESIDENT PARK TO RELEASE KIM DAE JUNG IMMEDIATELY, ALTHOUGH HAM FOUND GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN PARK'S POSITION THAN KIM; BOTH URGED PATIENCE ON OUR PART. I STRESSED TIME FOR ACTION WAS IMMEDIATE FUTURE AND KIM AND HAM HAVE AGREED TO MAKE FURTHER EFFORTS SEPARATELY WITH PARK IN VERY NEAR FUTURE. END SUMMARY.

1. FORMER PRIME MINISTER KIM CHONG-P'IL SPENT THREE HOURS WITH PRESIDENT PARK FOLLOWING HIS RETURN FROM LENGTHY OVERSEAS TOUR IN EUROPE, AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA AS PARK'S SPECIAL ENVOY. KIM FOUND PARK MUCH MORE CONFIDENT AND IN COMMAND OF SITUATION THAN WHEN HE LEFT SOME EIGHT WEEKS AGO. PARK WAS CONFIDENT HE COULD HANDLE TROOP WITHDRAWAL RELYING LARGELY ON HIS OWN RESOURCES AND IN FACT RELISHED BEING ABLE TO GO IT ALONE FREED FROM DEPENDENCE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SEOUL 03365 251043Z

ON US. FUNDAMENTALLY, PARK WAS IN AN UNCOMPROMISING MOOD, APPARENTLY EXPRESSING SUFFICIENT BITTERNESS TOWARDS US AS TO LEAD KIM TO COMPARE PARK'S MOOD TO HIS POSTURE TOWARD JAPAN AFTER AUGUST 15, 1974 ASSASSINATION OF HIS WIFE. ALSO INDICATIVE OF HIS MOOD WAS PARK'S SUGGESTION TO KIM TO "REST UP," RATHER THAN OFFERING KIM NEW ROLE AS HE HOPED FOR.

2. PARK GAVE LITTLE INDICATION OF BEING WILLING TO COMPROMISE ON MYONGDONG RELEASE OR OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS IN SHORT TERM, REITERATING HIS FEARS THAT OPPOSITION DISSIDENTS WILL CONSIDER ANY CONCESSION THE RESULT OF US PRESSURE AND JUST PUSH HARDER WITH POTENTIALLY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES. KIM SAID HE TRIED TO CONVINCE PARK THAT KOREA MUST ALSO ADJUST TO VIEWS OF OTHER NATIONS AND EASE CONTROLS OVER DISSIDENTS. HE THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT PARK IN HIS PRESENT MOOD WOULD COME AROUND IN SHORT TERM ALTHOUGH HE IS OPTIMISTIC FOR LONGER TERM. KIM MADE CLEAR THAT HE PERSONALLY FAVORS CONCESSIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INCIDENTALLY WAS NOTABLY RELAXED ON TROOP WITHDRAWAL QUESTION, POINTING OUT THAT PROCESS OF WITHDRAWING GROUND TROOPS BEGAN IN 1969 AND FURTHER STEPS SHOULD NOT HAVE COME AS SURPRISE AT PRESENT TIME.

3. I REVIEWED THOROUGHLY US POSITION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND STRESSED THAT TIME FOR ACTION BY ROKG WAS IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE RATHER THAN SOME MONTHS AHEAD. AT KIM'S REQUEST, I OUTLINED FOR HIM POTENTIAL COSTS TO ROK IN FAILURE TO ACT IN MOST STARK TERMS, POINTING OUT WE ARE IN COLLISION COURSE. KIM WAS MUCH IMPRESSED AND ASKED FOR A LITTLE TIME TO MAKE A FURTHER EFFORT TO CONVINCE PRESIDENT PARK TO MOVV. WE HAVE AGREED TO MEET AGAIN IN EAR Y MAY.

4. AMBASSADOR HAM, ON OTHER HAND, FOUND PRESIDENT PARK IN MORE FLEXIBLE MOOD WHILE STILL DEFENDING HIS POSITION. HAM SAID THAT HE EXPLAINED PRESIDENT CARTER'S
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SEOUL 03365 251043Z

POSITION IN VERY STRAIGHTFORWARD, FRANK MANNER, WHICH HE INCIDENTALLY FELT OTHER KOREANS HAD FAILED TO DO FULLY. HE STRESSED CURRENT MODERATION IN CARTER'S POSITION, HIS AVOIDANCE OF PUBLIC ATTACKS ON KOREAN HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY TO GIVE PRESIDENT PARK OPPORTUNITY ACT WITHOUT US PRESSURE, AND THE SYMBOLIC IMPORTANCE OF RELEASE OF KIM DAE JUNG AS PRESIDENT PARK'S LAST ELECTION OPPONENT.

5. PARK, ACCORDING HAM, SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO RELEASE KIM DAE JUNG IF LATTER WOULD RESTRICT HIS OPPOSITION ACTIVITIES AND NOT USE RELEASE AS SPRINGBOARD TO RALLY OPPOSITION FORCES AND TO STIMULATE STUDENTS TO DEMONSTRATE OPENLY IN STREETS. IN THIS CONNECTION, CRITICAL FACTOR IS US ROLE. IF KIM DAE JUNG IS CONVINCED HIS RELEASE RGSULTS ENTIRELY FROM US PRESSURE, HE WILL THEN FEEL ENCOURAGED TO CONTINUE UNCOMPROMISING OPPOSITION. PARK WOULD LIKE SOME SIGNAL FROM US TO DISCOURAGE THIS VIEW ON PART OF KIM, SUCH AS STATEMENT THAT HIS IMPRISONMENT WAS LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL.

6. HAM RECOGNIZED THAT SUCH A STATEMENT BY US WAE IMPOSSIBLE BUT WISHES TO EXPLORE OTHER MEYNS FOR EMPHASIZING RELEASE OF KIM DAE JUNG ACT OF STRENGTH ON PART PRESIDENT PARK RATHER THAN CONSEQUENCE SOLELY OF US PRESSURE. HE IS CONVINCED THERE IS FLEXIBILITY IN PARK'S POSITION THAT NEEDS PROBING. AS I DID WITH KIM, I IMPRESSED UPON HAM NEED FOR EARLY ROKG ACTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE. HAM PLANS TO SEE PARK IN A WEEK OR SO AND HAS ALSO AGREED TO CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS TO CONVINCE HIM TO ACT FLEXIBLY AND MAKE NECESSARY CONCESSIONS.

7. COMMENT: REASONS FOR DIFFERING IMPRESSIONS OF PARK REFLECTED BY KIM AND HAM CAN BE SPECULATED UPON AND MAY ONLY INDICATE IN PART VARYING TACTICS USED BY PARK TO HANDLE THESE CONFIDANTS COMING FROM SUCH DIFFERENT BACKGROUNDS. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS CLEAR FROM BOTH CONVERSATIONS THAT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 SEOUL 03365 251043Z

PARK STILL NEEDS TO BE CONVINCED TO TAKE VERY EARLY STEPS ON MYONGDONG RELEASE. TO ESCALATE PRESSURES ON PARK FURTHER, I THEREFORE PRESSED BOTH TO MOVE VERY QUICKLY TOWARDS SECOND EFFORT AT PARK. OF ALL THEEN CLOSE TO AND WITH ACCESS TO PARK, KIM AND HAM NOW APPEAR THE TWO MOST LIKELY TO PUT TO PARK IN STRAIGHTFORWARD FASHION THE CASE FOR RELEASE OF MYONGDONG PRISONERS. I SHALL HAVE FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS SHORTLY ON OTHER STEPS.
SNEIDER

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLICIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, PRISONERS RELEASE, CAT-B
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 25-Apr-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977SEOUL03365
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: P850070-2730, N770002-0700
Format: TEL
From: SEOUL
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770422/aaaaaszo.tel
Line Count: 148
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: eb2d969f-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 16-Mar-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2704046
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: PRESIDENT PARK AND HUMAN RIGHTS
TAGS: PFOR, SHUM, PREL, PINT, PHUM, KS, US, (HAM PYONG-CHUN), (KIM CHONG-P'IL), (KIM DAE JUNG), (PARK CHONG-HUI)
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/eb2d969f-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009